

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council  
Chi P'eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of  
Foreign Affairs  
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister  
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter  
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter  
Two Notetakers

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

DOS Review Completed.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff  
Winston Lord, NSC Staff  
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff  
Miss Irene G. Derus, Notetaker

PLACE: Villa #3, Peking, China

DATE AND TIME: February 16, 1973, 2:15 - 6:00 p.m.

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PM Chou: Yes, we also don't know very well what happened. We only know that the Soviet Ambassador is carrying on certain activities. And the Soviet Ambassador to Phnom Penh has gone back to Phnom Penh.

Dr. Kissinger: As Ambassador?

PM Chou: The Soviet Ambassador.

Dr. Kissinger: They have had a Chargé there.

PM Chou: Recently there was a Chargé there, and according to information they are going to send an Ambassador there.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know that.

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25

PM Chou: That is recent information. As for the Cambodian country, why can't you accept to have negotiations with Norodom Sihanouk as head of state?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know him as well as the Prime Minister. I understand it is a nervewracking experience. [Chou laughs.]

PM Chou: Did Senator Mansfield say any words or discuss with you?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes, Senator Mansfield is prepared to conduct negotiations with Sihanouk.

PM Chou: But unfortunately Prince Sihanouk wasn't in Peking. He was elsewhere. So your people say that after the President was elected for a second term, then Senator Mansfield would come again to China.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but he is not qualified to discuss that for us, and he would only confuse the situation. He is too emotional about this. This is not an emotional problem. I will - is the Prime Minister finished with his observation?

PM Chou: I have just raised this question and see what you have.

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Dr. Kissinger: I have been told that [pointing to a paper being held by the Chinese side]. Is this the article? I haven't read the text. I just read a summary. Actually the Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, was astonished when we said that once we give them money for certain categories they can use it for anything within that category. He apparently wasn't used to treatment like that from other countries. [Chou laughs.]

But it is important for us to be able to do this. We want the countries of Indochina to be independent. We have no other interest in that area. We don't need any bases in Indochina. But for us to be able to establish this relationship, the DRV must cooperate to some extent. If there is no ceasefire in Laos and no withdrawal of forces, how can we ask our Congress to give money? It is psychologically impossible. Article 20(b) of the Agreement says foreign forces must be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia without any condition. And we are prepared to withdraw our forces, and we have talked to Thailand, and it will withdraw its forces. So the DRV must live up to this obligation. Now they are very close to a ceasefire in Laos, and I frankly do not understand what is delaying it. Perhaps they will conclude it today.

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30

PM Chou: We will be able to get information everyday from official sources as to whether or not it has been signed.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I will find out when I get back.

Now about Cambodia. It is obviously a very complex situation, and we have no particular interest in any one party.

PM Chou: From the very beginning you would not admit that. I refer to the coup d'etat. It was not done by the CIA. So after you examine your work, you will find how it was not done by them.

Dr. Kissinger: It was not done by them.

PM Chou: Like the situation in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a different situation.

PM Chou: Then who did it?

Dr. Kissinger: I have told the Prime Minister once before when I first learned of the coup d'etat I thought Sihanouk had done it, that he would come back after three or four days. I thought he had done it so he could show Hanoi that his troops there made the population very unhappy. That was my honest opinion.

PM Chou: Yes, you have told me about it.

Dr. Kissinger: That was my sincere conviction.

PM Chou: But I was quite skeptical about the CIA so I asked you to make a study of it.

Dr. Kissinger: I did make a study of it. Why should I lie to you today? It makes no difference today. The CIA did not do it.

PM Chou: So it was done by France?

Dr. Kissinger: It could have been done by France. It could have been done by other interests. It could even perhaps have been done independently by Saigon. But it was not done by America nor did we know about it. At that

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31

time our policy was to attempt to normalize our relations with Sihanouk, and you will remember that the Prime Minister and I exchanged some letters at that time. We have always been opposed to the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. We are opposed to that today. We think the North Vietnamese should withdraw their troops into Vietnam. We did not think they had the right to maintain troops on foreign territory.

Now we believe that there should be a political negotiation in Cambodia, and we think that all the political forces should be represented there. And that does not mean that the existing government must emerge as the dominant force, but how can we, when we recognize one government, engage in a direct negotiation with Sihanouk? This is out of the question. But if there were a ceasefire and if North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn we would encourage a political solution in which Sihanouk would play a very important role. We don't want necessarily Hanoi to dominate Laos and Cambodia, but we will not support in either of these countries, and certainly not in Cambodia, one political force against the others.

But if the war continues -- first of all, if the North Vietnamese - they are violating Article 20(b) of the Agreement. Secondly, it will be almost impossible for us to go to our Congress and ask for economic support for a country that has its troops on foreign territory. It is difficult enough as long as they have troops in the South, but that we can treat as a special case. We believe a solution consistent with the dignity of Sihanouk is possible, and we have so far refused overtures from other countries that have different views. But there has to be some interruption in military activity because otherwise our Air Force will continue to be active on one side, and there is no end to it. My difficulty in meeting with Prince Sihanouk is no reflection on Prince Sihanouk. It has to do with the situation there.

PM Chou: France has maintained relationships with both sides. And the same is true of the Soviet Union, so things have been so complicated.

Dr. Kissinger: France wants to pick up what is left over without any risk and without any investment. [Laughter]

PM Chou: Three years ago during the time of the occurrence of the Cambodian incident, the French had sent Prince Sihanouk to the Soviet Union so Lon Nol at the time took a further step to announce the overthrow of the Cambodian monarchy and to abolish the royal system. So as a result Kosygin sent

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32

Sihanouk to Peking. So in standing on the just side we should give them support. Further, Lon Nol at the time counted on us to maintain the original relationship, and Lon Nol even said that it was permissible to use Sihanouk Harbor to transport weapons to South Vietnam as was done by Sihanouk before. And prior to that Sihanouk also asked Lon Nol to be in charge of this matter -- that is to transport weapons to South Vietnam, and he gained money out of that. So Lon Nol was most familiar with this matter. And now after engaging in subversive activities he wanted to directly collect the taxes so that was too unreasonable and unjust so we rejected him. During that month - more than one month, they continued their initiative - our Ambassador proved that. At the beginning he refused to let our Ambassador leave Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I have always believed that if Sihanouk had returned to Phnom Penh rather than Moscow, he would still be King or Prime Minister.

PM Chou: And he might be arrested.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, possibly.

PM Chou: Because Lon Nol would do anything he wished to.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we will never know this, but in any event....

PM Chou: Do you know Lon Nol very well?

Dr. Kissinger: Once. I didn't think he is an extremely energetic man.

PM Chou: He is half paralyzed.

Dr. Kissinger: He is actually very anxious still to establish relations with you.

PM Chou: No, we wouldn't do that with such a person. You should also not deal with such a man who carries on subversive activities against the King. It is just for you not to support India in dismantling Pakistan. On that one we stood together because you supported justice. But we think it is not very -- it is not fair for you to admit Lon Nol.

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33

Dr. Kissinger: But I think it might be possible to find an interim solution that is acceptable to both sides and I think, for example, that the Lon Nol people would be willing to negotiate with the Chief Minister of Sihanouk here. [To Mr. Lord: What is his name again?] Penn Nouth. And that might lead to an interim government which could then decide who should be Chef d'etat. This possibility has also occurred to us.

PM Chou: Would that do if you go without Lon Nol?

Dr. Kissinger: The end result could well be without Lon Nol.

PM Chou: No only the Prime Minister of Sihanouk wouldn't engage in such a negotiation, but there is the Khmer resistance in the interior area in Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: What would not be acceptable?

PM Chou: To take Lon Nol. . .

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it doesn't have to be Lon Nol himself. It could be somebody from that government.

PM Chou: Have you had any contact with the Soviet Union and French on this point, or would they go to you for that?

Dr. Kissinger: No we have not talked to France at all. The Soviet Union had very vague conversations, their Ambassador with me. But I thought they were leaning more towards Lon Nol than the other side. They were certainly not leaning towards Sihanouk.

PM Chou: Because he is not so fond of Sihanouk at all.

Dr. Kissinger: But they made no concrete -- because I said to the Vice Minister when he was in New York, "I want to talk to the Prime Minister." I have talked to Le Duc Tho about it, and he said he is in favor of negotiation. He said they wouldn't make the final decision in Hanoi, but, of course, you will be in direct contact with them.

PM Chou: And he told me that you said that you would go to me and talk.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. He said to me first, that it would be best if I talked to you, and then I said I would be glad to. Le Duc Tho always has a slight problem with his time sequence.

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34

PM Chou: So this question is quite similar to the question of the Secretary General. [Laughter] Of course, since Sihanouk is in China we cannot but tell him your opinion in our wording, but of course, we have our own position on this question.

Dr. Kissinger: We would appreciate it if he would not repeat it in newspapers and interviews. His self-discipline isn't up to Chinese standards.

PM Chou: It is impossible. He often told others what I had told him, and also some times when I hadn't told him. [Laughter] So the word wouldn't be very clear what the Premier had actually told him. So after learning about your ideas and what we learned about it, we wouldn't tell him all about it. Perhaps he would broadcast it and it would be carried in Chinese newspapers, and it wouldn't be all right for us not to carry it in our newspapers. The freedom our People's Daily has given to Sihanouk is much greater than any freedom granted to any Heads of State by any country at all. General DeGaulle didn't get freedom like that when he was in Britain. He would be sure to include it in his message if he was told something.

We support his Five Point Declaration of March 23, 1970. That time you were not involved. And we also supported the declaration issued jointly by the Head of State, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia which was issued on January 26. And later the three other Ministers in the interior area of Cambodia also supported this declaration. This is still our position. Do you know the Five Point Declaration of March 23, 1970?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: At that time you were not involved with it.

Dr. Kissinger: This is an extremely unusual event. None of my colleagues have ever heard me admit I didn't know something, but I will know it as soon as I can get a copy. Have your English or French copies?

PM Chou: Both.

Dr. Kissinger: Either one I can read. I have not studied it, but the major problem, frankly, is not the formal position but what evolution we foresee. And from our side we are prepared to cooperate with you, if we can find a way with him to come up with a solution consistent with his dignity.

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35

PM Chou: You have told us your ideas, and we have learned about it, but at the moment perhaps this is not possible. We will consider it again, and next time I will tell you our ideas.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.



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MEMORANDUM

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Affairs  
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Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff  
Winston Lord, NSC Staff  
Cdr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff  
Mary Stifflemire, Notetaker

PLACE:

Great Hall of the People, Peking

DATE & TIME:

Saturday, February 17, 1973  
2:20 - 6:25 p.m.

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Dr. Kissinger: First, about Cambodia. I cannot add much to what I said yesterday. But we would be in principle prepared -- after you have had an opportunity to consult with Sihanouk -- to discuss with you who might be acceptable negotiators on both sides and acceptable principals in an interim government. And I repeat, we would make an effort to find a solution which is consistent with the dignity of all sides. We also believe that an interruption in military activities after the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces...

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31

Chou En-lai: As for this question, as I said yesterday it is still under consideration, so I wouldn't reply today. Perhaps tomorrow I will be able to do so.

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Chou En-lai: The last time you said it would be desirable for Mr. Mansfield to come alone.

Dr. Kissinger: You are quite right. He is very insistent on coming, and we thought we could get around the problem by sending him on some governmental mission, so it is not your invitation but our proposal -- our sending him. But we don't insist on that. We are prepared to tell him that he must find a companion from the other Party. That may be the easiest.

Chou En-lai: But he is quite good at keeping faith, that is he will say what he should say and not say what he should not say.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Except where Sihanouk is concerned. He is a little bit emotional on that subject.

Chou En-lai: And he talks a little bit excessively so that is why Sihanouk is already not too happy about it. He said Samdech Norodom Sihanouk should act as provisional head of state. But Sihanouk says he is already head of State. He did it out of good intentions but on the contrary it has led to the unhappiness on the part of Sihanouk. Senator Mansfield looks very earnest but perhaps he is not very mature politically.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I agree, and we don't want him involved in political negotiations. He can study humanitarian problems and exchanges and contacts. But he has no standing with us on political problems.

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Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister,  
Acting Director of American Pacific Affairs  
Department  
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister  
T'ang Wen-sheng, interpreter  
Shen Jo-yun, interpreter  
Two Chinese notetakers  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff  
Alfred Le S. Jenkins, Department of State  
Winston Lord, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff  
Miss Irene G. Derus, Notetaker

PLACE:

Great Hall of the People, Peking, China

DATE AND TIME:

February 18, 1973, 2:43 p.m. - 7:15 p.m.

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PM Chou: Now there are two other matters I would like to discuss with you. One is Cambodia. Because it seems this time during this visit it will be difficult to make further progress. We know your ideas. You are more clear about our position. We gave you the documents in English and French. We gave you already the 5-point statement of March 23, 1970, and also the January 26, 1973, but we should further give you the January 23 one of the three Vice Ministers of the Royal Government of National Union in the interior part of Cambodia. And we are in agreement with Vietnam in respecting the position of the Front of National Union of Cambodia and also the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia. Our tendency would be that you should cease your involvement in that area. Of course you would say in reply that other parties should also stop their involvement.

... a civil war the matter would be relatively more simple. Of course it wouldn't be easy to immediately confine it to a civil war. The situation would be like China in the past. Of course it is not possible to hope for Cambodia entirely copying the previous China situation. But one thing can be done, that is, we can talk in various ways to make your intention known to the various responsible sides in the National United Front of Cambodia. Because the National United Front of Cambodia is not composed of only one party; it also is composed of the left, the middle and the right.

Of course, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk wishes to be in a central position, as is the King of Laos and Prime Minister Phouma. They actually now have two leading persons; one is the head of state, the other is the Prime Minister, Penn Nouth. Of course in the interior the strength of the left is larger. And we also believe that differences will also occur in the Lon Nol clique.

France is also active, and so is the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is also attempting to fabricate their own Red Khmer but they can't find many people. But it might in the future appear. So, in the future, if there is some information you would like to give us in this respect, we can also give you some too. But it would only be information. It would not be -- we have not yet reached the stage where we could provide any views or suggestions.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: And we would like to take very prudent steps, because we wish to see the final goal of Cambodia realized; that is, its peace, independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Dr. Kissinger: We completely agree with these objectives.

PM Chou: But we will still have to wait and see in which way these objectives can be realized. And you know, and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk also knows, that we would never want to turn Samdech Norodom Sihanouk into someone who would heed to our beck and call. If we did that, that would be like hegemony. Many of the views he expresses in our People's Daily are not necessarily our views, but we give him complete freedom. Although he has written songs about nostalgia about China -- in Peking he wrote a very good poem about China being his second motherland -- and although he is writing such poems we do not cherish illusions. I was going to try to persuade him not to try and publish the second song. I advised him to use "homeland" because "motherland" was too excessive. He insisted on "motherland". We must be prepared for the day when he says it doesn't count! Anyway it was all written by him; it has nothing to do with us. Of course he is now saying I am one of his best friends, that I am one of his best friends, "as Mr. Mansfield is." It doesn't matter. That is only personal

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40

relations. He is still the Head of State of the Buddhist State of Cambodia. So we still have to wait and see the developments of that issue.

So if we wish to see Southeast Asia develop along the lines of peace and neutrality and not enter a Soviet Asian security system, then Cambodia would be an exemplar country.

Dr. Kissinger: We are in complete agreement with that objective. And we have the same difficulty determining in exactly which direction to put our influence.

PM Chou: We still have to study that problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to exchange information. It would be kept in strictest confidence. And we also believe. . .

PM Chou: Anyway I believe you to a certain degree answered me, when I said about the fact that Lon Nol will not do. I do not mean that the forces that he represents do not count.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that. But before one can act on that, one has to have some idea of the alternative. I also agree that if it can become a Cambodian civil war rather than a foreign war, that would be the first step toward realizing these objectives.

PM Chou: We understand the directions. We understand our respective orientations. Because it is impossible for Cambodia to become completely red now. If that were attempted, it would result in even greater problems. It should be settled by the United Front, on the basis of the policy I just now mentioned; that is, independence, peace, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity.

Dr. Kissinger: Those principles we agree with, and we now have to find some framework for achieving them in a way that takes account of all the real forces.

PM Chou: So, one we agree.

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T O P S E C R E T/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY SWH0031

APRIL 13, 1973

FROM: LORD

TO:

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PLEASE GIVE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO YOUR CUSTOMER.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE US SIDE HAS NOTED WITH EXTREME DISAPPOINTMENT THE RECENT REMARKS OF THE PRIME MINISTER WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. THE CHINESE SIDE WILL RECALL THAT THE US SIDE, DURING DR. KISSINGER'S RECENT VISIT TO PEKING, OFFERED TO CONDUCT A CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF CAMBODIA, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH ALL ELEMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY WOULD BE REPRESENTED. FURTHERMORE, THE US SIDE WISHES TO RECALL THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, WITH US SUPPORT, UNILATERALLY CEASED ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND OFFERED AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS. AT THAT TIME THE US SIDE CEASED ITS MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA. THE ONLY RESPONSE TO THESE OFFERS HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN MILITARY ATTACKS AND THE REFUSAL TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS. THE CHINESE SIDE IS ALSO AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BLATANTLY AND OUTRAGEOUSLY VIOLATED THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 7 CONCERNING INFILTRATION, ARTICLE 15 CONCERNING RESPECT FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND ARTICLE 20 CONCERNING LAOS AND CAMBODIA. THE CHINESE SIDE HAS RECEIVED DETAILED DOCUMENTATION ON THESE VIOLATIONS AND THE US SIDE IS PREPARED TO SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE USEFUL.

IT CANNOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR ONE-SIDED PUBLIC POSITIONS TO BE TAKEN, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE FACTS ON THE CURRENT SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA. THE US SIDE WISHES TO REITERATE ITS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO ADHERE TO THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT, END ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA, AND WORK FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THAT COUNTRY THAT BRING ABOUT TRUE NEUTRALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. THE US SIDE BELIEVES,

\* \* \* \* \* WHSR COMMENT \* \* \* \* \*

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HOWEVER, THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL INTERESTED COUNTRIES TO WORK FOR MODERATION ON THESE MATTERS. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN AN EQUITABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION BE FOUND. THE US SIDE WISHES TO UNDERLINE THE EXTREMELY GRAVE SITUATION THAT WILL ARISE IF NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATIONS AND MILITARY ESCALATION IN THE REGION CONTINUE.  
END TEXT

Briefing item--HAK only

Peking Indicates Continued Strong Support for Sihanouk

The Chinese leadership has indicated its continuing strong support for Prince Sihanouk and his role in resolving the current Cambodian situation. Sihanouk was given a "grand welcome" in Peking upon his arrival from Hanoi on April 11. A state banquet was given the next day, and Premier Chou En-lai gave a speech which emphasized that the Prince's visit to the "liberated areas" in Cambodia "has once again eloquently proved that [he] is the head of state, beloved and supported by the Cambodian people. Chou "strongly condemned" the U.S. for continuing its "wanton bombings" in Cambodia and its support for the "traitorous Lon Nol clique." Our position was said by Chou to "seriously contravene the stipulations of the Paris agreement" on Vietnam. An authoritative editorial in the People's Daily ~~also~~ gave added voice to Chou's remarks, emphasizing that the Prince's visit to the "liberated areas" showed that he was the legitimate ruler of Cambodia, and contrasting the improving situation for the people's war against "U.S. aggression" with the "death-bed struggle of the Lon Nol clique."

(Solomon)

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SIHANOUK SAYS 'CAMBODIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE'

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(TEXT) PEKING, APRIL 13, 1973 (HSINHUA)--CAMBODIAN HEAD OF STATE SAMDECH NORODOM SIHANOUK STRESSED AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE HERE THIS EVENING: "CAMBODIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, NOR COMPROMISE. IF THE USA DOES NOT STOP ITS INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA WE WILL GO ON FIGHTING."

THE SAMDECH SAID, TWO MONTHS AGO HE PROPOSED OFFICIALLY ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION OF CAMBODIA THAT HE MIGHT HAVE, WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS, SOME CONTACT WITH THE U.S. SIDE, TO STUDY TOGETHER A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA. HE SAID, "WE SHOULD BE READY TO FORGET ALL THE BOMBING AND SUFFERINGS IMPOSED ON OUR PEOPLE BY THE USA. WE PROPOSED TO HAVE A RECONCILIATION WITH THE USA," "BUT WE MAINTAIN THAT THE USA MUST PUT AN END TO ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA, BUT AN END TO AIDING LON NOL, AND CEASE ITS INTERFERENCE IN OUR AFFAIRS."

HOWEVER THE U.S. SIDE WAS NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH US, SAMDECH SIHANOUK POINTED OUT, SO WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE OUR ARMED RESISTANCE.

THE SAMDECH WENT ON TO SAY: "WHEN WE SPEAK OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE USA, WE MEAN TO NEGOTIATE THE QUESTION OF ENDING U.S. INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, NOT THE QUESTION OF CEASE-FIRE. THEY ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. FOR, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, CEASE-FIRE MEANS SPLITTING OUR COUNTRY, MEANS RECOGNITION OF THE LON NOL-CONTROLLED ZONE. AND THIS IS DANGEROUS. INSTEAD OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA, IT WILL PROLONG THE WAR. IF THE USA CEASES ITS INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, THE TRAITOROUS LON NOL REGIME WILL QUICKLY COLLAPSE. THEN, THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA WILL BE EASILY SOLVED."

SAMDECH SIHANOUK STRESSED: "WE NOW CONTROL NINE-TENTHS OF THE TERRITORY OF OUR COUNTRY. OUR PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ARE STRONGER THAN EVER. THE BOMBING BY U.S. PLANES CANNOT MAKE US RETREAT. INSTEAD IT WILL URGE US TO PRESS FORWARD. THE USA CANNOT DEFEAT US. WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, NOR COMPROMISE. WE DO NOT LIKE WAR. WE LOVE PEACE, BUT WE HAVE NO CHOICE."

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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PARTICIPANTS:

Huang Hua, People's Republic of China Representative to the UN  
Chunag Yen, PRC Deputy Representative to the UN  
Mr. Kuo, notetaker  
Mrs. Shih Yen Hua, Interpreter  
Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador David Bruce, Designated Chief of US Liaison Office in Peking  
Winston Lord, NSC Staff  
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, April 16, 1973  
5:40 - 7:55 p.m.

PLACE:

UN Mission of the People's Republic of China  
New York, N. Y.

Dr. Kissinger:

With respect to Cambodia, we are prepared to work with you to bring about some coalition structure along the lines that the Prime Minister and I discussed in Peking. We are not committed to any particular personality. And we would encourage negotiations between representatives of Prince Sihanouk and the other forces.

Our objective in Southeast Asia seems to us not totally dissimilar from yours. We want to prevent a security system extending in South and Southeast Asia controlled by one unit and one outside power. We believe this is best achieved if each country in the region can develop its own national identity.

We have reduced our military aid to South Vietnam to the level of replacement. We are not adding to their forces.

With respect to Cambodia, we have no interest in any American dominant or major position in Cambodia. We would immediately honor any ceasefire that is achieved in Cambodia.

So we hope that the situation in Indochina can be pacified. The longer there is a period of quiet, the more certain and permanent the withdrawal will be.

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Amb. Huang: If Dr. Kissinger has no more information, I would like to make some comments on the question of Cambodia and Vietnam. (Reading from document) First, on Vietnam, I am telling you in a personal capacity. Premier Chou En-lai stated clearly the Chinese position during his talks with Dr. Kissinger last February. We hope that the Paris Agreement will be observed by all parties. The Chinese side, on its part, undertook the obligation to respect the relevant part of the Agreement in accordance with the Final Act of the International Conference.

We know that the Vietnamese side has strived to carry out the Agreement strictly. It is no more a secret that prior to the signing of the Agreement, there was a postponement by the US side and it rushed to the South by all means shipments of large quantities of armaments planned for the whole year of 1973. And even when the US troops had withdrawn from South Vietnam, they left behind a considerable amount of equipment and bases to the Saigon authorities. Recently the US side has also indicated to Nguyen Van Thieu that it will continue to give all its assistance to him.

Since Dr. Kissinger has mentioned this question, I think it necessary to set forth my own views.

On the question of Cambodia, the Chinese position is consistent and has been made public. And I assume Dr. Kissinger must be well aware of it. Last February Premier Chou En-lai again advised the US side not to intervene in Cambodian internal affairs any longer so that the Cambodian people could resolve the problem by themselves. As publicly pointed out by Prince Sihanouk after touring the liberated areas, the Cambodian Peoples' Liberation Forces are fighting absolutely alone without the aid of the North Vietnamese troops or of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Forces.

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Prince Sihanouk has repeatedly indicated and still indicates, his readiness to negotiate with the US side. However the US side has not only refused to negotiate, but has intensified the bombing of Cambodia, which is most unpopular.

Under such circumstances it is only natural and irreproachable for the Chinese side to state its principled stand in public. We cannot but feel extremely surprised at your extreme disappointment.

It is impossible to find a way out of the Cambodian question by sustaining the Lon Nol traitorous clique. No amount of further US support to Lon Nol will be of any avail. On the contrary, it will only hamper the solutions of the Cambodian question, and at the same time will affect adversely Sino-US relations.

Another question is that in the President's March 16 letter to Chairman Mao--it mentioned that the integrity of China is a fundamental element in American foreign policy, and the US side believes that the viability and independence of China is in the interest of world peace. What is the implication?

The above are comments of mine made in a personal capacity. The last I want Dr. Kissinger to clarify.

Dr. Kissinger: The Cambodian comment was your personal comment, Mr. Ambassador?

Amb. Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The implication of this remark to Chairman Mao is for its own purpose and without any reciprocity on the part of the People's Republic, the US side would consider any threat to the integrity of the People's Republic as incompatible with its own interests and with the interests of world peace. This is as an American decision and without request for reciprocity.

Amb. Huang: I have nothing more to comment.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to Cambodia, since we are arguing between each other. I would have thought that it was in the interest of both of our countries not to put each other publicly in the position of embarrassment. Secondly, many things are possible as a result of evolution that are very difficult to accept as a result of military pressure. And we believe that a constructive solution of the Cambodian problem is possible if it is not the result of military pressures, including discussions with representatives

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of Prince Sihanouk.

With respect to American military equipment in Vietnam . I told the Prime Minister the legal position, but I didn't insist on it. And we, therefore, showed some understanding for the first six weeks of the ceasefire. Since the infiltrating is continuing without any sign of abatement, and since we have stopped sending additional equipment, we face the problem where the military balance will be seriously affected unless we do something.

Amb. Huang: A few days ago the Cambodian Prince made some statements, and I am sure that your office has already received them.

Dr. Kissinger: But my office doesn't tell me everything, only that which they think is good for me.

Amb. Huang: On April 8 Prince Sihanouk made a statement to the correspondent of the French News, Alliance France Press; on April 12 at a banquet given by Chou En-lai; and on April 13 he made a statement at the press conference.

I assume that you already have all this, and I won't take your time to tell you what he said. I just wanted to call your attention to it.

Dr. Kissinger: I have read some of it. He has a tendency of blaming me for his difficulties.

24 April 1973

1. Enclosed for the information of the Chinese side is the new version of the Soviet draft for a nuclear agreement. The U.S. side has not given a formal response, but it can say now that it will not accept this text. This draft states as absolute obligations elements which the U.S. side could only consider as ultimate objectives and then only if other conditions are met. The U.S. side will discuss with the Chinese side its plans and will continue to keep the Chinese side informed on this question.

2. With respect to the Cambodian situation, the U.S. side wishes to repeat its willingness to see a settlement which includes all political forces, including those of Prince Sihanouk. The U.S. side is prepared to undertake discussions with the Chinese side looking towards this objective either in Washington or Peking after Ambassador Bruce's arrival.

3. The U.S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side that Ambassador Sullivan will meet with North Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Thach in Paris beginning April 27, 1973 with a view to ensuring strict implementation of the Vietnam Agreement. This meeting will be announced during the morning of April 25, 1973 Washington time. These talks are designed to prepare the way for a subsequent meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho around the middle of May. The U.S. side reiterates its strong view that all interested countries should exercise restraint

- 2 -

with regard to Indochina and should encourage moderation by the parties to the Vietnam Agreement. The U.S. for its part is prepared strictly to implement the Agreement.

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TO RICHARD CAMPBELL FOR DR. KISSINGER

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DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE, PARIS (EYES ONLY FOR KISSINGER)

ED 11652: XGDS 1  
TAGS: PFDR, CH

SUBJECT: CALL ON CHOU EN-LAI

1. ON MAY 18 CHOU EN-LAI SUMMONED ME ON SHORT NOTICE TO CALL ON HIM AT 6:30 PM AT GREAT HALL OF PEOPLE. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHTS OUR HOUR-AND-TWENTY-MINUTE CONVERSATION. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MSSRS. JENKINS, HOLDRIDGE AND PLATT. ON CHINESE SIDE MAJOR FIGURES WERE CHIAO KUAN-HUARLT KUAN-HUA AND HUANG CHEN. MEMCON FOLLOWS:

2. AFTER PLEASANTTRIES AND EXPRESSIONS OF SATISFACTION THAT RELATIONS HAD DEVELOPED FASTER THAN OUTSIDE OBSERVERS HAD PREDICTED, CHOU ASKED ABOUT MY PLANS FOR MISSION ACTIVITIES. WHEN I SAID I WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, CHOU REFERRED TO SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID WE SHOULD EXERT VIGOROUS EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT "SPEEDILY" AGREED STIPULATIONS IN THIS FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENT

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

CY TO SCOWCROFT, HOWE, SEC. FILE

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SO CAREFULLY FORMULATED.

3. CHOU THEN SPOKE OF INDO CHINA, HOPING DR. KISSINGER WOULD SUCCEED IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH LE DUC THO AT PARIS. I ASSURED CHOU THAT NO ONE DESIRED SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR MORE THAN THE PRESIDENT. CHOU OBSERVED THAT TO "DRAG OUT" THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD AFFECT PROGRESS ON OTHER ISSUES. HE MENTIONED THE PROBLEM VIETNAM HAD ALWAYS POSED FOR A SATISFACTORY PRC-US RELATIONSHIP, WHICH HE HAD FREQUENTLY CALLED TO DR. KISSINGER'S ATTENTION.

4. HE THEN ASKED ME TO CONVEY FOLLOWING TO PRESIDENT: "THE DRV AND THE PRG ARDENTLY WISH TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE CLAUSES OF THE AGREEMENT. IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH TO STABILIZE BEFORE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS CAN PROCEED. THE NORTH MUST ALSO HAVE TIME TO RECOVER."

5. SHIFTING CONVERSATION TO CAMBODIA, CHOU SAID THE ONLY WAY TO FIND A SOLUTION WAS FOR THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO IMPLEMENT FULLY ALL THE SUBSIDIARY CLAUSES OF ARTICLE 20. WE AGREED THAT ALTHOUGH RESPECTIVE VIEWPOINTS DIFFERED USG AND PRC SHARED GOAL OF PEACEFUL, NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT CAMBODIA--"MORE PEACEFUL, NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT THAT EVER BEFORE," CHOU ADDED.

END PAGE ONE

7. CHOU THEN PRAISED SIHANOUK ALONG FAMILIAR LINES, DESCRIBING HIS TRIP TO ANGKOR AS COURAGEOUS ACT. HE CITED RECENT "NEW YORK TIMES" INTERVIEW WITH SIRIK MATAK AS EVIDENCE THAT SIHANOUK WOULD WIN OVER LON NOL IN A REFERENDUM.

8. COMMENT: CHOU USED OCCASION TO CONVEY SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE:

---HIS STRESS OF SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE (TAIWAN WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED) WAS A MOST EMPHATIC AND AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT ON THAT THEME, WHICH HAS BEEN RECURRENT IN EACH CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD WITH PRC OFFICIALS SINCE ARRIVAL. IT IS EVIDENT HE IS SERIOUSLY PREOCCUPIED WITH SUBJECT.

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---THERE WAS A BROAD HINT OF INQUIRY AS TO WHETHER I WOULD  
BE PREPARED TO MEET SIHANOUK. I DID NOT REACT.

---HE IS DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT INDOCHINA, AND FEELS PARTICULAR  
URGENCY OVER ACHIEVING SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA. I DO NOT KNOW  
CONTENT HIS TALKS WITH LE DUC THO ON LATTER'S WAY TO PARIS,  
BUT HE MAY HAVE EXPRESSED SUCH VIEWS TO NORTH VIETNAMESE

---HIS CARE IN DESIGNATING CHIAO AS MY CONTACT (HE DID THIS  
THREE TIMES), AND HUANG CHEN AS PRC CHANNEL IN WASHINGTON,  
WHEN  
JUXTAPOSED WITH HIS ANNOUNCEMENT HUANG'S MAY 25 DEPARTURE,  
SUGGESTS THAT HE HOPES FOR PROMPT WASHINGTON-PEKING FOLLOWUP  
ON ITEMS RAISED IN THIS CONVERSATION. BRUCE  
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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

## PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Huang Hua, People's Republic of  
China Ambassador to the United Nations

Mr. Kuo

Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Cmr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

## DATE AND TIME:

Sunday, May 27, 1973

10:00 - 11:15 a.m.

## PLACE:

PRC Mission to the UN  
New York City

[Excerpt]

Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, I want to talk briefly about our meetings  
[in Paris] last week.

We went through the Agreement article by article, and came to a tentative agreement on Vietnam and on Laos. And we are prepared to sign a joint communique with them which calls for implementation of various parts of the Agreement. I will leave you a copy of this Communique and of the understanding on Laos as it now stands. [Dr. Kissinger handed over the document at the end of the meeting, Tab A.]

The difficult problem we now face is Cambodia. The North Vietnamese say they have no real influence because Sihanouk is in Peking and you are the only people who have influence. I frankly do not believe this is true. I

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believe you have some influence but not the sole influence.

Here is the problem as we see it. We cannot be put in the position where the issue is settled by purely military means, because it is difficult for us to observe other parts of the Agreement if some parts are being systematically violated.

We agree with the objective which your Prime Minister pointed out to Ambassador Bruce--to have a neutral, independent and <sup>peaceful</sup> free Cambodia. As I said to your Prime Minister in Peking, our basic objective in Cambodia does not seem to us incompatible with China's objective. And frankly we do not think our basic objective in Indochina is incompatible with China's objective. We would like as far as possible to give each nation a chance to develop itself and to prevent a bloc which could support the hegemonial objectives of outside powers.

We recognize it is an extremely complex problem in Cambodia. But here is our tentative thinking--and there is some importance, if it is at all possible, in having some understanding before we go over again--which will be June 5.

Huang: June 5th.

Kissinger: June 5th. We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia, and we are prepared to withdraw the very small advisory group we have there. And we are prepared to arrange for Lon Nol to leave for medical treatment in the United States. In return we would like a ceasefire--if necessary, say for ninety days--a negotiation between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group; and while this negotiation is going on in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking. And when this process is completed, in some months, we would not oppose the return of Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia. But it is a process that has to extend over some time, and it must not be conducted in a way that does not take into account our own necessities.

We have not presented it in so much detail to the North Vietnamese, but we have presented the basic idea.

Now if we cannot come to an understanding, we will have to find means of pressure, no matter what Congress does--not on you but on the other parties there.

Huang: What do you mean by the other parties?

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Kissinger: The parties to the Paris Agreement. I mean the North Vietnamese. And then certainly, even if we sign this communique it will not be implemented. Because we can certainly not give economic assistance to the North Vietnamese under those conditions. So we want to bring this to the attention of the Prime Minister, first to show him we have taken his considerations to Ambassador Bruce very seriously, and also to say to him that if we could reach some understanding or get some assistance prior to our next meeting, it could lead to permanent peace in Indochina.

Huang: Well you have gone ahead of me on the question of Cambodia--because I also have got something for you.

Kissinger: When I become a really experienced diplomat, I will know--because the Ambassador will speak first!

Huang: We must show respect for you because you are our honored guest! [looks at talking paper] In his talk with Ambassador Bruce on May 18th, the Prime Minister touched on the question of Cambodia and the Premier mentioned the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. It is imperative that the two sides respect the sovereignty of Cambodia.

Kissinger: The two sides, the North Vietnamese and...

Huang: The United States. On the Cambodian side, Prince Sihanouk as well as the resistance forces at home, are willing to conduct negotiations with the U.S. side. The Chinese side considers that the sooner the U.S. side stops its intervention in the affairs of Cambodia, the better. It will serve the overall interest. And Premier Chou En-lai also mentioned that Mr. Mansfield once asked for another visit to China, and he wondered whether he still has this desire.

Kissinger: He always has this desire, but he is not competent to talk for the United States Government with Sihanouk. But he still has this desire. I can let you know, or let your Ambassador know.

Huang: I just wanted to remind you of what the Prime Minister said to Ambassador Bruce.

Kissinger: We agree with the Prime Minister, the sovereignty of Cambodia must be respected. And we are prepared to stop all military action in the circumstances I described, and we are willing to listen to other ideas on this subject. And we are also willing to let the members of Ambassador Bruce's staff begin conversations with Prince Sihanouk as soon as a ceasefire is

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arranged in Cambodia. So we would be prepared to work within the spirit of what the Prime Minister has said.

Huang: I will convey what you have said about Cambodia to Peking.

Kissinger: Good.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of PRC  
Liaison Office in Washington  
Han Hsu, Deputy Chief of PRC Liaison Office  
Chi Ch'iao Chu, Staff of PRC Liaison Office  
(Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lawrence Eagleburger, NSC Senior Staff  
Richard Solomon, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, May 29, 1973  
6:00 p.m. - 6:45 p.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office  
The White House

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Kissinger: You didn't bring a spy with you. When Huang Hua arrived in New York, the press said he had a master spy with him.

One other matter that concerns us very much, that I discussed with Huang Hua Sunday, is Cambodia.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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We agree with the objectives which the Prime Minister stated to Ambassador Bruce, which is a neutral and independent Cambodia. We also agree very much with what Huang Hua said, that it should be a Cambodia free of outside interference.

Huang: And also a peaceful Cambodia.

Kissinger: But we sometimes have the impression Prince Sihanouk is too impatient. We think if talks could be started between the Phnom Penh Administration and the Khmer in the country, and if a ceasefire could be arranged -- say sixty days -- to allow negotiations to proceed, we could allow our people in Peking to begin talks with Sihanouk. Under those conditions we would of course stop the bombing. I go to Paris now next week, and we have pretty well settled the Vietnam issue and Laos issue -- and I gave your Ambassador the draft communique on Sunday.

Huang: Yes.

Kissinger: If then the fighting in Cambodia can be stopped, we will be in a position to have the Agreement strictly implemented, and there will be peace in Indochina. If not, we will have to bring pressure, and the whole process will continue. But we are prepared to face the realities of the situation. So given Prince Sihanouk's presence in Peking, any discussion that can take place with him before I leave here next Tuesday would be very much appreciated.

I have already said this to Ambassador Huang Hua, but I just wanted to underline the importance we attach to it.

The Ambassador always has to listen to my troubles with the North Vietnamese. You did this in Paris a few times. You always served me good food while you were doing it. [Laughter]

Huang: After so many years of negotiations in Paris, you finally reached agreement, and I hope it will be fully implemented. As for the views which you expressed concerning Cambodia, I will very speedily report to our Government. And Dr. Kissinger is of course very clear about Ambassador Bruce's talk with the Premier.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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Kissinger: Oh, yes. Which suggested that our objectives may be very similar. But there is always the problem of phasing them in a relevant time period.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with  
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of PRC  
Liaison Office in Washington

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 30, 1973  
9:15 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Ambassador Huang Chen  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

\* \* \*

The other point the President wished to make to the Ambassador concerned the Southeast Asian situation. The Vietnam peace agreement removed a major irritant in our relations. But there was one outstanding problem, that is Cambodia. He could not emphasize too much the importance of reaching a settlement in Cambodia similar to that in Laos. Now China played a very important role. It would be a tragedy if we allowed Cambodia to flare up and reopen the conflict all over Indochina. The President wanted to emphasize that the United States was not committed to any one man. But there could not be peace at the point of a gun -- on either side. We wanted a settlement that let the warring elements live together. Over a period of time the Cambodian people could determine which is better for their future. The highest priority, the President reiterated, was to work out some sort of peace agreement in Cambodia.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARITICPANTS: Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liason Office in Wash.  
Chi Chiao-chu, Official of the PRC Liason Office  
Chien Ta-yung, Official of the PRC Liason Office

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Lawrence Eagleburger, NSC Staff  
Richard Solomon, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

TIME AND DATE: Monday, June 4, 1973  
3:00 - 3:30 p.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office  
The White House

[Excerpt on Cambodia]

Huang: Tomorrow?

Kissinger: Yes. And you know our views. It seems the only outstanding issue is the Cambodian issue, but in the last two days there we settled outstanding technical issues. On Vietnam and Laos, that is essentially settled. We have found, with the Vietnamese, that to settle something does not mean it will be carried out. But that is a different problem.

Huang: It is our hope at all times that the Agreement on Restoring Peace in Vietnam will be fully implemented, article by article.

Kissinger: As I told you last week, if there is any advice you can give to your Vietnamese friends on Cambodia, this would be the moment to do it. And we have outlined to you our idea of how this could work.

Huang: There is another message. [He takes a paper from his briefcase.]

Kissinger: I knew! I knew the General doesn't commit all his reserves at once.

Huang: Since Dr. Kissinger has mentioned this question...

Kissinger: We appreciate it very much.

Huang: To save time, just read it in English.

[Chi reads Tab B.] [Chi then hands it over to Dr. Kissinger.]

"The Chinese side has learned of the U.S. side's tentative thinking on the settlement of the question of Cambodia. Just as Premier Chou pointed out to Ambassador Bruce, in settling the Cambodian question, all parties concerned should respect Cambodia's sovereignty. It is impossible for the Chinese side to conduct any talks with the United States in place of the Cambodian side. The Cambodian question can only be settled through direct negotiations between the U.S. side and the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia led by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. The Chinese side can communicate the U.S. tentative thinking to the Cambodian side, but as Samdech Sihanouk is still visiting Africa and Europe, it is inconvenient for us to contact him through diplomatic channels. For the sake of accuracy, the Chinese side would like to repeat the U.S. tentative thinking as follows: "The United States is prepared to stop its bombing in Cambodia. It is prepared to withdraw the military advisory groups it has there. It is prepared

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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to arrange for the withdrawal of Lon Nol for medical treatment in the United States. In return, it would like a cease-fire, if necessary for 90 days, a negotiation between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group. While this negotiation is going on in Cambodia, the United States would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and the subordinates of Prince Sihanouk in Peking. And when this process is completed in some months, the U. S. would not oppose the return of Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia. But it is a process that has to extend over some time. "If there are any inaccuracies in the above, it is expected that the U. S. side will provide corrections."

Kissinger: That is exactly correct. It is clearer than I tend to express myself, as the Prime Minister knows. It is an exact summary of our views. You can communicate this, and we will scrupulously carry out our side of any such understanding that we may reach. [Huang nods yes.] The difficulty we now face is produced by my departure now for Paris for my discussions with the North Vietnamese. And I wonder whether you have any ideas on how to handle this problem.

Huang: Our attitude is demonstrated in this message.

Kissinger: Let me say this, Mr. Ambassador. You have Le Duan and Pham Van Dong in Peking right now. I received a telegram from Ambassador Bruce describing the reception--which is a novel experience. We used to have to depend on newspapers. We have no complaint about that.

We have no objection, Mr. Ambassador, if your Prime Minister discussed with the North Vietnamese our thinking, in these terms. I leave it up to the Prime Minister. If he wishes, he is free to discuss our thinking along these lines with the North Vietnamese.

Huang: I can report this view of yours.

Kissinger: If he has ideas he wishes to pass on to me, you can pass them to General Scowcroft, who can get in touch with me very quickly in Paris.

Huang: If there is any such communication, we can do that.

Kissinger: Or at any time, while I am in Paris.

Huang: Fine.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Received  
4 June 1973

The Chinese side has learned of the U.S. side's tentative thinking on the settlement of the question of Cambodia. Just as Premier Chou pointed out to Ambassador Bruce, in settling the Cambodian question, all parties concerned should respect Cambodia's sovereignty. It is impossible for the Chinese side to conduct any talks with the United States in place of the Cambodian side. The Cambodian question can only be settled through direct negotiations between the U.S. side and the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia led by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. The Chinese side can communicate the U.S. tentative thinking to the Cambodian side, but as Samdech Sihanouk is still visiting Africa and Europe, it is inconvenient for us to contact him through diplomatic channels. For the sake of accuracy, the Chinese side would like to repeat the U.S. tentative thinking as follows: "The United States is prepared to stop its bombing in Cambodia. It is prepared to withdraw the military advisory groups it has there. It is prepared to arrange for the withdrawal of Lon Nol for medical treatment in the United States. In return, it would like a cease-fire, if necessary for 90 days, a negotiation between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group. While this negotiation is going on in Cambodia, the United States would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and the subordinates of Prince Sihanouk in Peking. And when this process is completed in some months, the U.S. would not

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oppose the return of Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia. But it is a process that has to extend over some time." If there are any inaccuracies in the above, it is expected that the U.S. side will provide corrections.

June 5, 1973

The US side has noted with surprise and regret the June 4 statement by Premier Chou En-lai that the United States must "respect the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, immediately stop all their actions in violation of the Agreement, and stop bombing and military intervention in Cambodia." At a time when this whole subject is actively being discussed with the DRV as well as with the PRC, the US side does not find the statement helpful and is particularly concerned at being urged publicly, especially in language which implies a threat, to desist from something we have already offered to stop, in our private communications to the Premier.



PARTICIPANTS:

Chi P'eng-fei, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Tseng Tao, PRC Ambassador to France  
Assistant Minister Wang Hai-jung  
Nancy T'ang, Interpreter  
Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State for E. Asian and Pacific  
Affairs.

Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for NSC Operations  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

TIME AND DATE:

Wednesday, June 13, 1973  
10:00 - 10:45 a.m.

PLACE:

PRC Ambassador's Residence  
25 Blvd. du Chateau  
Neuilly-Sur-Seine

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Dr. Kissinger: There are two other aspects not in the agreement. There is an understanding that the Laotian settlement will be completed by July 1st, and that all foreign troops will withdraw within 60 days after that.

FM Chi: You mean 60 days after the 1st of July?

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. Of course we are in favor of as rapid a withdrawal as possible. We also understand that both sides will make a major effort to bring about a diplomatic settlement in Cambodia. We have given you our ideas on Cambodia. It may have happened after you left Peking. We received a reply from you.

FM Chi: Yes, I was in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be very grateful if you could act in this sense, of your communication to us. You had correctly understood our position.

FM Chi: There is only one problem, that Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is not now in China and it is difficult to contact him.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. When will he be back?

FM Chi: [Laughing] He was supposed to be back by the end of June. But you know his temper, and he likes to add countries when he is happy.

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Dr. Kissinger: Maybe we should depress him!

FM Chi: We think he will be back in late June.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand this, and hope you can express your views in a constructive way.

FM Chi: But it seems, with regard to the Cambodian issue, that if Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is not recognized as the one and only official representative, and if he is not consulted and not talked to, it will be very difficult for those ideas to be effected.

Dr. Kissinger: But, Mr. Foreign Minister, we gave you a procedure by which we could talk to him. It could be done. But in all these problems, it is important to have transition periods and not push one side against the wall.

FM Chi: Of course there would be a period of transition. But that period of transition can only be for a certain period of time.

Dr. Kissinger: That is clear. But I think the procedure we have given you would recognize the principles we have discussed in Peking. [Chi nods yes.] I mean in the sense that we would deal with Prince Sihanouk.

FM Chi: You mean you would move in that direction?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. But one should not ask too much too quickly from us.

FM Chi: Because you had certain ideas when you came to Peking last time. Premier Chou told Ambassador Bruce of our views.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. But we have modified ours to some extent. And what we are prepared to do is consistent with what the Premier told Ambassador Bruce.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office  
Han Hsu, Officer in the PRC Liaison Office  
Chi Chao-chu, Officer in the PRC (interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the Pres-  
ident for National Security Council Operations  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, June 14, 1973  
6:35 - 7:40 p.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office  
The White House

Kissinger: I told your Foreign Minister I knew you speak English.

Huang Chen: We also heard about your talk.

Kissinger: Your communications are good. We met in your old residence.

Huang Chen: You had mao-tai in the Red Room. It was a secret.

Kissinger: We couldn't continue negotiating! We immediately yielded on everything.

I wanted to see you about a few things. First, about our meetings in Paris. I told your Foreign Minister we had concluded an understanding about Laos and Cambodia. [Hands over Tab A.] These will not be published. Their existence will in fact be denied.

Huang Chen: Thank you.

Kissinger: I have never understood, since your allies don't keep signed agreements, why they should keep agreements whose existence is denied.

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Huang Chen: We hope that both of you will keep the Paris Agreement.

Kissinger: We can't reiterate enough that the key element in Indochina is now Cambodia, and everything else will be easy once that is settled. But we have given you our ideas and we had an opportunity to discuss it briefly with your Foreign Minister. We understood further action has to wait until Prince Sihanouk returns to Peking.

Huang Chen: He yesterday was still in Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: Yes, we understand it will take about 10 days.

Huang Chen: He will visit Romania after Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: He has already been in Albania.

Huang Chen: You follow his movements well!

Kissinger: On one trip we were looking after him for you! Our intelligence services thought I had lost my mind. You remember, when your Prime Minister asked me to see what we could do. Last year.

June 13, 1973.

UNDERSTANDING ON CAMBODIA

1. On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Cambodia that recognizes the Cambodian people's fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm that the settlement of the Cambodian problem falls under the sovereignty of the Cambodians.

2. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm the obligations of Article 20 of the Paris Agreement. All foreign troops, military advisers, and military personnel shall be withdrawn from Cambodia, as required by Article 20(b) of the Agreement.

3. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will exert their best efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian problem.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison  
Office, Washington  
Han Hsu, Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office  
Chi Chiao-chu, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Operations  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, June 19, 1973  
10:00 - 10:50 a.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office  
The White House

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Huang Chen: Have you preliminarily decided on the date of your visit?

Dr. Kissinger: Would you like a proposal? We will do it soon. I will make a proposal within a week. Maybe when you come to San Clemente. [Laughter]

I want to tell your Prime Minister that if by the time I get to Peking a cease-fire exists in Cambodia, I would be prepared to meet Prince Sihanouk to have political discussions. But it should not be announced in advance.

Huang Chen: I will convey this view of yours to the Prime Minister.

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
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:                    USA    Henry A. Kissinger  
   Assistant to the President  
   for National Security Affairs

   Brent Scowcroft  
   Deputy Assistant to the President  
   for National Security Affairs

   Lawrence S. Eagleburger   
   Deputy Assistant to the President  
   for National Security Council  
   Operations

PRC    Ambassador Huang Chen

   Mr. Chi (interpreter)

DATE, TIME &  
PLACE:

July 6, 1973 - 10:00 a.m.  
Dr. Kissinger's Office  
Western White House

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Ambassador Huang: I'll finish up and then listen to you. The other thing I want to discuss is Cambodia. I have a paper here to give you. (Hands over paper, text of which follows.)

"The Chinese side informed the U.S. side earlier that as Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Africa and Europe, it was yet infeasible for the Chinese side to communicate to him U.S. tentative thinking on a settlement of the Cambodian question. Although the Chinese side had informed the U.S. side that negotiations between Samdech Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh traitorous clique would be impossible, the U.S. side nevertheless openly refused to negotiate with Samdech Sihanouk, which enraged him all the more. However, according to news reports, U.S. government

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

officials have recently made some disclosures on this question, which have given rise to various speculations. At the same time, it is learned that the Lon Nol clique has gone to the length of spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official negotiations with the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens. In spreading such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours ulterior motives, widely attempting to confuse public opinion and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question. The Chinese side is of the view that such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question and will even cause trouble. The Chinese side cannot but bring this to the serious attention of the U.S. side."

Ambassador Huang: This message was received before Prince Sihanouk returned to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: (reading paper) He is certainly enraged.

Ambassador Huang: Since you always indicated in the past that you didn't want to talk to him, he is angry.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but you have received several communications from us. These were before his return to Peking.

Ambassador Huang: Now that Sihanouk has returned to Peking, we will hand over your thinking to him.

Dr. Kissinger: I gather he had not received this by the time of his arrival.

Ambassador Huang: By the looks of it, no.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not know that the Prime Minister could speak French.

Ambassador Huang: He was in France.

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6

Dr. Kissinger: I had forgotten. He made some comments in French about us.

Let me give you our view on Cambodia. First, we cannot control what the Lon Nol people are saying. But they do not know what we have said to you; the proposals we have made to you. It is just speculation on their side.

I want to speak frankly. What we have proposed to you -- a ceasefire, if necessary for only 90 days, we believe takes care of the situation. We have no interests in Cambodia other than what the Prime Minister said to Ambassador Bruce the first time he saw him. This is our objective. We have no objection -- in fact, we would welcome it -- if the Government in Phnom Penh is on very friendly terms with Peking and would refuse to participate in great power hegemonial activities in Southeast Asia.

As I have expressed before, it is a delicate problem for us as to how to manage the transition. If we are pushed into an undignified position, it will only strengthen the forces in this country who will oppose other things we may judge it necessary to do over the next three or four years. So we think it important that the matter in Cambodia be ended in a way not necessarily wounding for the U.S. We take great care not to embarrass you publicly. We really think it is not in our interest to create a situation which is unnecessarily difficult for either side.

Ambassador Huang: I will report this to my Government. Our attitude has already been made clear by the Prime Minister to Ambassador Bruce. As the Prime Minister said, all sides should respect Cambodia's sovereignty. We cannot negotiate about Cambodia. That must be between you, those now in power in Phnom Penh, and Sihanouk.

Dr. Kissinger: We're not asking to negotiate with you, but we have made suggestions as the basis for a solution. If the Prince proposes a ceasefire before my arrival we could stop bombing, and then reach a solution satisfactory to everyone's needs.

Ambassador Huang: It is up to the Prince. It is not for us to predict.

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7

Dr. Kissinger: No, but our thinking could be mentioned to him.

Ambassador Huang: I can only report. It depends thereafter on my Government.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

Ambassador Huang: The Prince said a great deal at the airport.

Dr. Kissinger: I know. The guns have been going off all over Peking these days. The Prime Minister, for example, made some remarks to our Congressional delegation the other day.

Ambassador Huang: I have not seen this.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm not criticizing. He bracketed us, but he hasn't hit us yet.

Ambassador Huang: We haven't heard anything of this.

Dr. Kissinger: No? What he said was in the spirit of what you said before. It was new to the Congressmen, but not to us.

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*would be  
Ambassador Hnam  
10:30 am July 6, 1975*

The Chinese side informed the U.S. side earlier that as Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Africa and Europe, it was yet infeasible for the Chinese side to communicate to him U.S. tentative thinking on a settlement of the Cambodian question. Although the Chinese side had informed the U.S. side that negotiations between Samdech Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh traitorous clique would be impossible, the U.S. side nevertheless openly refused to negotiate with Samdech Sihanouk, which enraged him all the more. However, according to news reports, U.S. government officials have recently made some disclosures on this question, which have given rise to various speculations. At the same time, it is learned that the Lon Nol clique has gone to the length of spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official negotiations with the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens. In spreading such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours ulterior motives, wildly attempting to confuse public opinion and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question. The Chinese side is of the view that such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question and will even cause trouble. The Chinese side cannot but bring this to the serious attention of the U.S. side.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen, Head  
of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington, Friday,  
July 6, 1973, 11:30 a.m.

PLACE: The President's Office  
The Western White House

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Ambassador Huang Chen  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Chi Ch' ao-chu (Interpreter)

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The President then turned to Cambodia. At the present time it was our judgment, he said, that the Chinese Government held the key, through the influence it may exert on Sihanouk. The situation was urgent, because if it continued to deteriorate, the possibility of the conflict spreading was real. The war in South Vietnam was over, and in Laos. They were continuing to negotiate in typically Laotian fashion. But in Cambodia the war was going on, and the President felt very strongly that it did not serve our mutual interest to be dragged into differences and even a confrontation about Cambodia. The United States had no desire to retain a special position of influence or to retain any military forces there. Our desire was to have a government in Phnom Penh to bring peace. If our two countries could work together it would have a good effect not only in the relations of our two countries but also on world opinion. There were many danger spots, like the Middle East. The small country of Cambodia was the only one where a war was going on. We therefore felt a way must be found to settle it. The United States had no unilateral solution, but rather it took the influence of all interested parties.

The President then said he was not asking for an immediate comment from the Ambassador. But the President hoped the Ambassador would convey these ideas to Premier Chou En-lai so that the US and PRC could discuss it if it was not settled by the time Dr. Kissinger got to Peking. Ambassador Huang responded that he would carefully convey the President's words to the Premier. He added that China, too, wished for an early end to the

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*WASHINGTON 16*  
July 12, 1973

TO: Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, Peking

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

REF: (a) Peking 015  
(b) Peking 016

1. Scowcroft met yesterday with Han Hsu and Chi Ch'ao-chu to discuss two items. We had been informed that agreement on my visit and timing of an announcement would be delayed until Huang could consult in Peking. Scowcroft registered on a personal basis my surprise at this development, since we had earlier been invited to come at any time for any length of time. Han carefully pointed out delay <sup>related</sup> ~~regarded~~ <sup>to</sup> only specific dates of visit and announcement, not fact of trip itself. We have now proposed announcement date of July 19, with fallback date of July 23.

2. Scowcroft then discussed importance of my trip in terms of expectations being raised regarding Cambodia. He pointed out that I was architect of Sino-American rapprochement and that were the outcome of my trip to be appraised in negative terms, it would undermine my authority and <sup>unless we pointed it clearly</sup> ~~thus jeopardize the entire policy of~~ <sup>reconciliation</sup> ~~reconciliation~~. Scowcroft asked, with this in mind, whether the

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- 2 -

Chinese could give us some estimate of possible outcome of my visit with regard to Cambodia. Han promised to report to his government, <sup>he</sup> but observed the Prime Minister was well aware of my contribution to rapprochement. Han further <sup>with</sup> observed that Chou had stated many times the Chinese position on Cambodia -- that a solution was a matter for discussion among the Cambodians. Scowcroft acknowledged this but pointed out that the friends of the various Cambodian parties should use their influence in favor of a settlement in the interests of both our countries.

3. Many thanks for your thoughtful analysis in referenced messages. Your comments are most helpful in structuring <sup>our material</sup> ~~ourselves~~ for my upcoming talks, and I will appreciate anything further which you may have.

Warm regards.

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*Handwritten: 7/11/73*

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That was a personal note. Now, I would like to make some observations on a semi-official basis. As you well know, Dr. Kissinger is the principal, and practically the sole, architect of Chinese/American rapprochement. He is inseparably identified with that policy -- and its success, on the U.S. side, has been almost exclusively due to his tremendous efforts on its behalf. For some time into the future that will continue to be the case, at least until this policy becomes fairly institutionalized throughout the American Government. At the present time, that is far from the case. In particular, even those now supporting the policy of normalization do it principally on the basis of sentiment. Moving beyond this sentimental plane to the practical concepts of active support of China in the event of a military contingency remains with Dr. Kissinger alone.

I point this out as background. As you undoubtedly know, expectations have been raised about Dr. Kissinger's visit, especially with respect to Cambodia. Under these circumstances, should Dr. Kissinger come back from his visit to Peking empty-handed, that result would seriously undermine his authority in the eyes of the U.S. Government and people and could thus substantially jeopardize the policy of Chinese/American reconciliation with which he is so closely identified. We would therefore appreciate some idea from the Chinese side of what he may be able to bring

*back regarding the Cambodian situation*

*Handed to Gen. L. H. H. Han H. H.  
6<sup>30</sup> pm, 26 Feb, 7/18/73*

It is believed that the U.S. side is aware of the recent developments in the situation in Cambodia. Of late, Samdech Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, and the National United Front and the Royal Government of National Union led by him have repeatedly enunciated their position in public, reiterating the Five-Point Declaration of March 23, 1970, and demanding that the United States immediately end its bombing of Cambodia, stop its military aids to the Lon Nol clique and withdraw all military personnel dispatched by the United States and its allies. In conformity with its consistent position stated to the U.S. side on many occasions, the Chinese side fully supports the above Cambodian demands. Nevertheless, the U.S. side is still obdurately continuing its bombing of Cambodia, intensifying its support to the Lon Nol clique and putting pressure on Samdech Sihanouk and the Royal Government of National Union in other respects. This has all the more enraged Samdech Sihanouk, the Royal Government of National Union and the Cambodian people. Under these circumstances, the Chinese side holds that it is obviously inappropriate to communicate to Samdech Sihanouk the tentative thinking on the settlement of the Cambodian question as set forth by the U.S. side in late May. The Chinese side wishes to inform the U.S. side of this with frankness.

The origin of the Cambodian question is clear to the U.S. side. "It is up to the doer to undo the knot." The key to the settlement of the question is held by the United States, and not by others. If the United States truly desires to settle the Cambodian question, the above reasonable demands raised by the Cambodian side should be acceptable to it. It is hoped that the U.S. side will give serious consideration to this and translate it into action.



July 24, 1973

The US side has consistently sought a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris Agreement. The other side has continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and responded to the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the Phnom Penh government and the cessation of US air actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive.

The Chinese side declared to the US side in its message of June 4 that it would communicate the US peace proposal of May 27 to Prince Sihanouk. This proposal accepted a long-standing Chinese suggestion for direct talks with Prince Sihanouk made during every visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking. The contents of the June 4 message were reiterated on June 13 by Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei and again in the Chinese message of July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels. On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking.

The Chinese message of July 18 has therefore been noted with astonishment. There has been no change in US policy and no increase in US activities. In light of these earlier assurances, and the principles and spirit of the Shanghai Communique, it is difficult to understand why the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American peace proposal to a leader located in Peking. It is utterly unreasonable that this leader

- 2 -

should publicly demand that communications to him go through Mauritania to which the Chinese side would not entrust the original US communication of May 27. This raises special difficulties because in reliance on the June 4 note and subsequent assurances, the US had not engaged in any other negotiations or responded to any other channels.

As to the substance of the Chinese note of July 18, the Chinese side will not be surprised that the US side rejects a "solution" so arbitrarily weighted against it. This is inconsistent with the requirements of reciprocity and equality. It is beyond the bounds of logic to be asked to negotiate on an issue when the other side, clearly and from the outset, leaves no room for negotiations. In such circumstances the US side will leave negotiations to the Cambodian parties.

ORAL NOTE

My Government notes, with regret, that this is the first time in the development of our new relationship that the Chinese word has not counted.

The Chinese side has often expressed its devotion to principle. The US side is no less serious. One of its firm principles is not to betray those that have relied on it. The US side believes that the Chinese side will welcome US adherence to this principle in other contexts.

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Arthur Hummel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
Far Eastern Affairs  
Winston Lord, NSC Senior Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Representative to the United Nations  
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter  
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, September 26, 1973  
12:30 - 1:20 p.m.

PLACE: Secretary of State's Suite, The Waldorf Towers  
New York City

\* \* \*

Amb. Huang: On the Cambodia question, there is a telegram to the Secretary General on September 10th but up till now the United Nations has not circulated this document yet.

Mr. Kuo: It's from Prince Sihanouk to the Secretary General.

Sec. Kissinger: I suppose it's because he has no official standing in the United Nations. He gives me much publicity.

Amb. Huang: I think you probably know that at the summit conference of the non-aligned they have adopted a resolution on the Cambodian question. That resolution recognizes the Royal Government of National Union under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk as the sole legitimate government of Cambodia and calls upon all non-aligned countries and other countries to render recognition and support to the just position of the Royal Government of National Union for the restoration of their seat at the United Nations and other international organizations.

Sec. Kissinger: As you know, we can't agree with this either. We stated our view on the Cambodian question on many occasions to the Chinese Government. The basic ideas we expressed to your side in May or June are still our ideas, and within that framework we are willing to proceed. But if Prince Sihanouk finds those unacceptable, the best solution really is to let events take their course in Cambodia.

We think our interests and those of the People's Republic from the overall point of view on Cambodia are not so different. We don't want Cambodia to be part of a big power system; under what particular domestic structure it is, that is not our principal concern. [There was some discussion of the translation among the Chinese.]

In this connection, you should know that we were told by Thailand this morning that there seems to be new activity in connection with the collective security idea. We pointed out that we were not in favor of it.

Amb. Huang: The Thai themselves have published some proposal in this connection in their papers. I don't know what you refer to.

Sec. Kissinger: The Soviet proposal on collective security.

Amb. Huang: We have consistently held that the Cambodian question should be settled by the Cambodians themselves free from any foreign interference. The situation in Cambodia now is very delicate and China will not get itself involved. During your past visits to Peking, you discussed the Cambodian question with the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister stated China's position.

Sec. Kissinger: I understand your position. We thought that what we discussed in May and June was consistent with your position and our necessity. Since then, of course, there have been many developments not foreseeable then. Of course, when I come to Peking if the Prime Minister wishes to discuss this, I will be happy to. Or if the Vice Minister wants to discuss it next week.

Who is coming to dinner from your side next week? How many people? We can get the technical people to work this out. Let's see -- should we get in touch with your Mission of the United Nations or in Washington?

Mr. Hummel: It's probably better here.

Sec. Kissinger: You should contact our Mission here for details. It is up to you. We will bring Mr. Hummel and Mr. Lord. It is entirely up to you, whatever you wish.

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

### PARTICIPANTS:

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.  
Acting Assistant Secretary for East  
Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Winston Lord, NSC Staff  
Charles W. Freeman, Jr. (interpreter, notetaker)

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister  
of the PRC  
Ambassador Huang Hua, Permanent Repre-  
sentative of the PRC to the United Nations  
Chang Han-chih, Alternate Representative  
to the United Nations General Assembly  
(interpreter)  
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary, PRC Mission  
to the United Nations (notetaker)

### TIME AND DATE:

Wednesday, October 3, 1973  
8:30 p.m. - 11:30 p.m.

### PLACE:

Waldorf Towers, 35-A  
New York City

\* \* \*

The Secretary: Speaking of my trip to Peking, we have again received several communications from Prince Sihanouk suggesting that we hold conversations in Peking. Among these communications are those through Senator Mansfield. With regard to Senator Mansfield, I would like to say that while we favor Senator Mansfield going to China, we do not favor him negotiating with the Prince. If he wishes to talk to the Prince, that is all right, but if Sihanouk wishes to make serious proposals, he must talk to a member of the Executive Branch. I have also told Senator Mansfield this. We take Sihanouk seriously. We would seriously examine any proposal which he might make. You are, of course, familiar with the various proposals which we have made to him.

The Vice Foreign Minister: We are very clear about Senator Mansfield's and Prince Sihanouk's personal relationship. We are also very clear on the US Government position on this point.

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

-18-

The Secretary: It would not be good for either of us to encourage the Legislative Branch to impose foreign policy decisions on the Executive. The Legislative Branch might come up with some positions which would not accord with our common concepts of the way we should proceed.

The Vice Foreign Minister: We have talked a lot about the Cambodian problem before. We do not need to go into details tonight but I think I might express my opinions on this as a philosopher.

The Secretary: You must understand that I don't understand anything about philosophy after the beginning of the 19th century.

The Vice Foreign Minister: But I would like to speak to you as a Hegelian rather than as a Kantian.

The Secretary: Please. As a philosopher.

The Vice Foreign Minister: It is clear that the best thing for both of us would have been that neither of us got involved in this situation but, of course, the actual situation is not so. I believe that the best way to handle this is to leave the matter to the Cambodians themselves. Let them work it out. I believe that when we discussed this last year, when we met, probably you did not accept the viewpoint which I put forward. As I said last year, the present international situation is so complicated that it is not worthwhile for either of us to get involved in a basically minor question like Cambodia. And the situation in general in the area has progressed. For example, the Vietnam problem is basically solved, on your side. And Laos, likewise. Of course, the questions have not ceased to exist, but the fighting has stopped. I cannot understand why you spend so much of your energy and so much of your attention on this Cambodian question, and by doing so, divert your attention from more important problems.

The Secretary: Our domestic opponents on foreign policy have used this Cambodian question to paralyze our other policies. So that is why, Mr. Minister.

The Vice Foreign Minister: I see your point.

In fact, one might compare your current Cambodian problem to the problem you faced with regard to the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1971. Actually, I should say that you were in much greater difficulty in regard to that problem than in Cambodia. Is that right?

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EYES ONLY

-19-

The Secretary: No. In 1971 we faced problems which were tactically more difficult, but strategically not as difficult as this one. We were involved in that situation for only a few weeks, and it was a containable problem. But the Cambodian issue is used to attack our whole foreign policy. I think that it is of the utmost importance that we maintain our credibility on this issue, since I believe that we must, in the future, make decisions that will perhaps be very surprising to our public opinion.

The Vice Foreign Minister: The Cambodian question is a very long story.

The Secretary: I don't want to argue about Cambodia. If we could do it all over again, in 1964 we would certainly not have tied the entire U.S. foreign policy to a country of 15 million people so far away from our shores. It is not important to our overall strategic position. Therefore, we can afford to be very flexible in the solution of the problem. As long as there is a real solution.

The Vice Foreign Minister: I should like to tell you something very ridiculous. As you know, China and Vietnam have a relationship which goes back 2,000 years. I'll tell you a joke. It wasn't until as late as 1954 that we were told by Ho Chi Minh about Cambodia. But our whole concept of Cambodia dates only from then -- that is, from 1954. And yet, China is so close to Cambodia. Isn't that ridiculous?

So perhaps from a long-term view we shouldn't take such a minor issue so very seriously and turn it into a major issue. We didn't even know there was a Cambodia until after 1954.

The Secretary: When I discussed Vietnam with the Prime Minister, it was in fact, a major foreign policy issue for us. Cambodia is not. It is a domestic problem. We can live with Sihanouk. That is not important. We can be flexible and live with any reasonable result.

The Vice Foreign Minister: I didn't want to talk in very detailed fashion about Cambodia.

The Secretary: We've not asked for your help in the Cambodia question.

The Vice Foreign Minister: The Cambodian problem is in some respects the same to both of us. You have not asked for our help, and we have not asked for yours. What I wish to emphasize is that, considering the overall situation, the Cambodian issue is very definitely only a side issue.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

-20-

The Secretary: From the U.S. point of view it is indeed a side issue. You are not involved there and I am sure that you will not become involved.

The Vice Foreign Minister: Yes, but there is a question as to how you interpret our degree of non-involvement. For example, we are not involved to the extent that we do not ask how the Cambodians will solve the problem. But both of us are in fact involved to some extent.

The Secretary: This is an example of your Hegelian dialectic. Once we agree that both of us are not involved, you explain how in fact we are involved.

The Vice Foreign Minister: If both sides seriously agree that neither is involved then perhaps we could genuinely not be involved in any issue. That would be very good. For example, you should stop giving any aid to Phnom Penh.

The Secretary: You can always give aid to Hanoi, and Hanoi will give it to the Cambodians.

The Vice Foreign Minister: Your interpretation is not correct on this point.

The Secretary: I'll tell you very frankly, Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, that as I see it, your interests and the interests of Hanoi are not the same in this issue.

The Vice Foreign Minister: I would not say that it is a question of our interests being different, but rather that our circumstances are not the same. I could tell you a good many stories. You do a good many things, but as you look back the objective result does not conform to your subjective motivation. I think that one of your best contributions is that you can connect your policies to your philosophy.

The Secretary: Only you Chinese understand this.

The Vice Foreign Minister: Going back to Cambodia for a minute. I understand that you face domestic difficulties on this issue. But looking at it from the point of the overall situation, it is simply not worth it to either you or to us.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

-21-

The Secretary: I do not plan to talk about this with the Prime Minister unless he raises the issue. Of course, if he raises it, I will talk about it. I am not going to Peking to talk about this.

The Vice Foreign Minister: Our attitude, as I have explained it, is that we should let the flames burning in Cambodia extinguish themselves, by themselves.

The Secretary: As long as the flames are in fact extinguished, we can live with the situation.

The Vice Foreign Minister: I advise you to read Hegel.

The Secretary: Which one of Hegel's many books?

The Vice Foreign Minister: Hegel's "Philosophy of History." There are many points which are absurd in Hegel but there are also great insights. I'm sure that we can discuss these problems effectively but we have very different backgrounds. In China we look more to long-term problems. I think you have come to understand this after the meetings you have had with Chairman Mao. Now that you are Secretary of State, perhaps it is more difficult for you.

The Secretary: One thing is easier, and that is that I don't have to go through planning two separate meetings with you in Peking. I thank you for your patience with that arrangement in the past.

The Vice Foreign Minister: In ten years we can look back to see whether what we have said tonight is true or not.

The Secretary: As a philosopher, I would agree. But I believe that the result in ten years will be the same regardless of what we talk about here. I even have some good idea of the way things will turn out. Perhaps we should write our predictions on a piece of paper, seal the paper and then open it up in ten years. I think we would come out fairly close to the actualities. As far as we are concerned, we see the road ahead but there is a big obstacle on the road, and the question is how we can get around this obstacle. Of course, Cambodia is not the problem. We understand your views on Cambodia.

The Vice Foreign Minister: I think it is remarkable that in the past in this country you were so afraid of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Perhaps fear is not the right word.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

-22-

The Secretary: I thought all members of the Communist Party were FBI agents!

The Vice Foreign Minister: What I mean is fear in the sense of fear of an ideology. But now you do not appear to be so afraid of either [Communism or the USSR]. The Soviet Union is a country of what? -- over 200 million people; China is a country of, I suppose, well over 700 million people. Together they are at least 900 million people. But you are not afraid of us; this I know.

Now, about the Cambodian issue. Whether Cambodia turns red, pink, black, white or what, what difference will this make in the end for world history? The best way out is for neither of us to get involved in Cambodia. You have some difficulties which we do not have, I know. Your difficulties with Congress and with the press. I wonder whether there is not a spy for the press in our midst today!

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EYES ONLY

Washington, D.C. 20520

ETS - HK - AA 3669 3

X  
Nov. 11, 1978

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Prime Minister Chou En-lai

Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei

Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua

Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Wang Hai-jung

Two Other Chinese Officials

Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter

Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter  
Chinese note-taker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Ambassador David Bruce, Chief U.S.  
Liaison Office

Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, U.S.  
Embassy Tokyo

Ambassador Robert McCloskey, State  
Department Press Spokesman

Winston Lord, Director of Planning and  
Coordination, Department of State

John Holdridge, Deputy Chief U.S.  
Liaison Office

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, November 11, 1973  
3:15 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.

PLACE: Great Hall of the People, Peking  
Peoples Republic of China

4 \* \*

Secretary Kissinger:

Maybe I should say a word about Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia we have two problems. One is the problem of maintaining the cease-fire in Vietnam. And the second is the problem of Cambodia. We believe that the resumption of large military operations in Vietnam would be extremely undesirable and have the potentiality of major involvement by our two countries. We would like to normalize our relations.

As far as Cambodia is concerned, I leave it up to the Prime Minister whether he wishes to have a more extended discussion. I simply want to say we are not, in principle, opposed to Sihanouk. In many of his private statements and public statements, he seems to be under the misapprehension that the United States Government is, in principle, opposed to him. That is absolutely incorrect. If he could return to Cambodia in a position of real independence for himself, we would be very interested in him as a leader. We are not interested in him if he is a captive of one particular faction that is simply using him for a very brief period of time in order to gain international recognition.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-24-

Prime Minister Chou: Have you taken note of the recent actions of the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. With respect to Sihanouk?

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps Ambassador Bruce is more familiar.

Secretary Kissinger: I am familiar with it. I have taken note of it. Our interest in Cambodia, insofar as we have interest, is to keep it out of great power confrontation, and we are interested in a truly independent, neutral Cambodia. We want no position for the United States in Cambodia. And we are not committed to any particular group of individuals in Cambodia. I leave it up to the Prime Minister whether this is a subject that he wants to pursue at a later meeting.

Prime Minister Chou: We will have to consider this for a while before we can raise our opinions. I would like to ask now why it is that the two South Vietnamese sides have shown no progress in their Paris meetings on the political aspects.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the same qualities that make the Vietnamese a heroic people make them politically an extremely uncompromising people; and they sometimes combine, at least the ones I know, the worst aspects of Confucianism and the French Lycee. For example, when I negotiated this additional communique in June, which will be my last one -- I will never again negotiate with them -- we had everything settled, when both parties conceived a new theory of international law: the order of obligations in which they appear in paragraphs determines the order in which they have to be performed. Each side attempted to push the obligations of the others into the beginning of the document and its own obligations to the end so its opponent would have to perform first. We spent nearly a week on the problem, although no treaty could ever be written if this became an accepted practice.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Prime Minister Chou: The protocol you mean?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. The protocol in June. Eventually, the objective situation in Vietnam will change for both sides, and then there will be real negotiating possibilities.

Prime Minister Chou: If we go into Cambodia, we will have to link it to the whole of Indochina, and if we are going to discuss it, we can do that later.

Secretary Kissinger: It is up to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and I will be prepared to do it. I will be prepared to discuss the whole of Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, compared to the overall international situation, this is but a very small corner now, although it had troubled you for more than four and one-half years since your President came into office.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Prime Minister Chou: But from the point of view of the overall international strategy, you have taken too much time on that small issue.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true, too.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council  
T'ang Wen-sheng, (Interpreter)  
Mrs. Yang Yu-yung (Interpreter)  
Stenographer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Ambassador David Bruce  
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff  
Mrs. Wilma G. Hall, Notetaker

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, November 13, 1973  
10:00 p.m. - 12:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Great Hall of the People  
Peking

\* \* \*

Prime Minister Chou: / From here I can hear our Cambodian friends complain that they are not receiving enough military support from North Vietnam.

Secretary Kissinger: That has other reasons.

Prime Minister Chou: But according to our account, it is extremely meager. You can hear Sihanouk on this issue.

T'ang Wen-sheng: You left the material you wanted to give the Premier about correspondents in Cambodia on the conference table in the Guest House.

Secretary Kissinger: I intended that.

T'ang Wen-sheng: Mr. Lord said that and the Premier picked it up.



\* \* \*

Prime Minister Chou: There does not seem to be any major fighting in Cambodia. We think it would be best for you to let go of that area.

Secretary Kissinger: If there is no major fighting, we will not interfere.

Prime Minister Chou: You have no treaty obligations to Lon Nol as you have with Thieu and the military dictatorship in Bangkok has undergone changes but they won't be of very major portions. It would be relatively better if that area could be one of peace and neutrality.

Secretary Kissinger: I will speak frankly. Our major problem with Cambodia is that the opponents of President Nixon want to use it as an example of the bankruptcy of his whole policy. So if there is a very rapid collapse, it will be reflected in our other policies. That frankly is our only concern.

Prime Minister Chou: Why is it that Senator Mansfield is in favor of letting loose and allowing Sihanouk to return?

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Mansfield is first of all an isolationist in the classical tradition. He is a true isolationist from the Middle West. Secondly, he has a sentimental attachment to Prince Sihanouk which is not related to reality and not reciprocated in any way. Because I think the Prince is a very shrewd calculator.

[Secretary Kissinger to Cmdr. Howe: See if they want to have a leadership meeting about my trip next week. Ask Scowcroft tonight.]

Prime Minister Chou: And because we also know of it. It is futile to do as he has. Because he also knows you will not meet him, he spoke very loudly at the Non-Aligned Nations Conference. He abused not only you but me.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not opposed to Prince Sihanouk's return.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

9

Prime Minister Chou: But they do not wish to do it that way. The only thing I wish to bring to your attention is that the Soviet Union wants to have a hand in that pie.

Secretary Kissinger: Not with our cooperation.

Prime Minister Chou: They might try to do it with <sup>the</sup> French. Thank you for bringing his mother here. It was a humanitarian effort.

Secretary Kissinger: That was only the right thing to do.

Prime Minister Chou: And when you were very enthusiastically discussing this matter with Lon Nol, your charge d'affaires discussed it with Lon Nol and the Commission and said that to enable the Queen to come to China, you might be able to provide the plane and medical personnel. But the French doctors who had been treating her for so long were so emotionally disturbed that they were on the verge of tears. Your charge' understood the situation and let the French do it.

Secretary Kissinger: We finally got our 'charge' under control. It was the first constructive thing he had been able to do in a year. So he is very grateful to you for giving him this opportunity.

Prime Minister Chou: Because the French were thinking, after having taken care of her for one whole year, you were just brushing them aside.

\* \* \*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

## PARTICIPANTS:

Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the  
People's Republic of China  
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor  
Chi Ch'ao-chu, Interpreter

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Arthur W. Hummel, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Department of State  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning  
Department of State  
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,  
National Security Council

DATE, TIME,  
AND PLACE:

June 24, 1974, 8:10-9:15 p.m.  
The Secretary's Office, Department of State

## SUBJECT:

Tour d'Horizon Discussion on the Eve of the  
Secretary's Departure for Europe and Moscow

\* \* \*

Ambassador Huang:

There is also one issue regarding Senator Mansfield. I should tell you about his visit to China, inasmuch as you expressed your concern about it at the Mayflower. At the Mayflower you said it would be best if he could go to China before the Congressional delegation. Subsequently Peking decided that Senator Mansfield's visit should be postponed until after September -- we have already informed him of this. We will welcome him a second time. This time he can stay longer, and travel to many more places. But during July and August we will be very busy. Senator Jackson will be going soon. We have given Senator Jackson priority as he has not been to China before. In addition, the Senator and Mrs. Mansfield dislike hot weather, and that is the hottest time of the year. So we suggest that he come after September.

In addition, I told him frankly that if he goes at the present time it is likely to give rise to speculation about Cambodian peace negotiations. He knows our position: we support the Cambodian people in continuing their struggle. We don't want to involve ourselves in peace negotiations. The present time is not convenient, but he can come after September.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think the Cambodian situation will be solved by September?

Ambassador Huang: I cannot predict anything. You know our position.

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

## PARTICIPANTS:

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC  
Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the  
United Nations

Chi Tsung-chih, Deputy Director, West European  
Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Department,  
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Interpreter)

Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary at the PRC Mission  
to the U.N. (Notetaker)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East  
Asian and Pacific Affairs

George Bush, Chief-Designate of the United States  
Liaison Office in Peking

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning, Department  
of State

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National  
Security Council

DATE, TIME,  
AND PLACE:

October 2, 1974, 8:15 - 11:35 p.m.

Secretary's Suite, Waldorf Towers, New York City

Secretary Kissinger:

There's one other question on which I wanted the Vice Foreign Minister's views, Cambodia. You agree that we should postpone debate for a year? (Ch'iao: We can't have our way.) I feel sorry for the Vice Foreign Minister surrounded by so many small, intractable countries. He can only have his way with the great powers. What would he do if a hundred Laotian elephants headed north? (Laughter)

The Ambassador (Huang Hua) should take a vacation, visit his family. He is so subtle that he cuts you but you don't know it until you have moved your limb. (Laughter)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Let's think of this problem another way. Sooner or later the Lon Nol government will quit the stage. (There is some discussion of how to best translate the Chinese phrase to "quit the stage." The Secretary says there is no elegant way to translate the idea. Everyone laughs.) That is to say, the U.N. debate is something that neither of us can control. So if the GRUNK is admitted, Lon Nol will be expelled. Why not let it happen? It will pave the way for you in solving this problem.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

23

Secretary Kissinger: Especially as there are not many royal governments in Peking nowadays.

What is your idea -- this is not a proposal -- in order to end the war in Cambodia, to convene an Asian conference, including the People's Republic, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Cambodia, to solve the problem.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: At the present moment I don't see what benefit such a conference would bring.

On this question, I'd go back and say that we have spent too much time settling small old problems which are a legacy of the past. As for yourself, you spent so much energy on Vietnam and finally a settlement was reached. Now there is Cambodia.

What I now say may turn out to be only empty words, but in my view the final result [of the present situation in Cambodia] is clear; it is only a matter of time. You see you solved the Vietnam question, and now only Cambodia is there each year as an obstacle. So now this question is not worthwhile, but it doesn't matter very much. Events have their own laws.

Mr. Solomon, didn't Fulbright raise this question?

Mr. Solomon: No.

Ambassador Huang: You discussed Vietnam with him.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I said [to Senator Fulbright] that your aid [to Vietnam] was a mountain, while ours was a small hill. I told Fulbright that on the whole we took a restrained attitude [toward the Vietnam situation].

Secretary Kissinger: Our attitude is that we are prepared to restrict our military aid to replacements.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Peking

November 26, 1974

11:15 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.

\* \* \*

Secretary Kissinger: There is another issue which I leave it up to the Chinese side whether it wishes to discuss, and that is the problem of Cambodia. We don't insist on discussing it, but I have the impression that whenever it is raised it creates a degree of irritation on the Chinese side which is uncharacteristic and in addition to being uncharacteristic is out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the subject being raised. From this I conclude the Chinese side considers us more than usually stupid on the issue of Cambodia. [laughter], and that you must have the impression we are missing some point that should be perfectly obvious. So I thought, if you want to, we could give you our analysis.

Because in one respect we are really not in such difference. We are not opposed to Sihanouk. We have no interest in Sihanouk's returning to Cambodia as a figurehead for Hanoi. But we would have no objection to him if he could head a truly independent government. And if you want to, we could have an exchange of views on this subject. If you promise me not to get irritated.

Minister Ch'iao: I don't think we have ever become irritated.

Secretary Kissinger: Not personally. No, we know your interest in Sihanouk and we are prepared to discuss it.

So this is the international scene as we see it, quickly. And then in our subsequent discussions we will go into more detail on each area.

[They confer.]

Vice-Premier Teng: Yes, it seems we don't have very much common language when it comes to the question of agriculture and energy. But we can exchange views.

Secretary Kissinger: I actually think we should have some common interests.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

-2-

Vice-Premier Teng: As for China itself, the food problem and energy problem do not exist for us, in that sense.

As for the Cambodian issue, I think you should be clear about our views, that is, both Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the resistance forces within the country are neither puppets of Hanoi or puppets of China as some people say. Figureheads.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't think they are figureheads of China.

Vice-Premier Teng: Nor of Hanoi.

Secretary Kissinger: That we are not so sure of.

Vice-Premier Teng: That we can assure you. They are entirely fighters for the independence of their own country and nation. Actually why does the United States have to get itself involved in this issue? Because from the beginning it was their own problem. Let them solve their own problem.

Secretary Kissinger: The United States is involved in the issue. It can't make the decision whether to get involved.

Vice-Premier Teng: Since you have the power to decide whether to get involved, you also have the power to decide not to get involved.

Secretary Kissinger: That may be partly true, but for the U.S. simply to abandon people with whom we have been working has a larger significance, and it is not a habit we should acquire lightly.

Vice-Premier Teng: It should also be true to say you have worked with Sihanouk for an even longer period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't exclude Sihanouk. We think we should find a formula for a negotiation to get started, the outcome of which would in all probability be Sihanouk.

Vice-Premier Teng: On this issue you would know we support Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the resistance forces within the country, and we support their position. And to put it frankly, we think if the United States is to place its hopes on Lon Nol or on any force you think would replace Lon Nol, that is not reliable.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

-3-

Secretary Kissinger: We think it is possible to produce a negotiation, at the end of which Sihanouk could quite possibly emerge as the controlling factor. We think it is in his own interest not to be totally reliant on one force, but to have many forces, factors to play with.

Vice-Premier Teng: That is your idea.

Secretary Kissinger: It is our idea that it is possible to achieve a solution in Cambodia in which Sihanouk could emerge as the dominant force, yes.

Vice-Premier Teng: As you wanted to discuss this specifically, we can.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Vice-Premier Teng: But I think that is all for this morning.

Secretary Kissinger: That is probably right.

\* \* \*



[TS-HK-AA366+]

Peking

Nov. 27, 1974

3:36 - 5:45 p.m.

Cambodia

Vice Premier Teng: And next, according to the Doctor's order, is the question of Cambodia. On the question of Cambodia I also made myself clear, and I have nothing to add.

Secretary Kissinger: Your Ambassador [Huang Hua] fired a whole bunch of cannons [on Cambodia] yesterday, at the United Nations. [Laughter]

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That's the routine work of our Ambassador. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: But this time he hit a few fortified positions. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: That proves these cannons are not so formidable -- but cannons will have to be fired.

Secretary Kissinger: We understand.

Vice Premier Teng: It can't be imagined that we will stop supporting the struggle of the Cambodian people.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

16

Secretary Kissinger: Can I give you our analysis? The United States has nothing to gain in Cambodia. Having withdrawn from Vietnam, we can have no interest in a long-term presence in Cambodia. On the other hand, as a question of principle, we do not simply abandon people with whom we have worked. But this is not the key issue right now. The key issue right now is, according to our conception, the best solution of the Indochinese peninsula is one in which each country can realize its national aspirations. And therefore we believe that solutions in which each of the states in the area can maintain its national independence, without being dominated by one, is quite frankly -- though you're a better judge -- in your long-term interest. If Indochina was dominated from one center, an aggressive force, in the context of some of the schemes for Asian collective security, could cause you problems.

Therefore we prefer a national solution for Cambodia. We believe Sihanouk offers perhaps the best possibility for a national solution. We believe that for Sihanouk to act effectively he must be in charge of a balance of forces in Cambodia, similar to Souvanna in Laos. Souvanna Phouma.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The situation is not the same.

Secretary Kissinger: It's of a different nature. I'm just being professorial; I'm not saying it can be achieved. If Sihanouk comes back as the head of the insurgent forces, he will not last long. He will just be a figurehead. And in our analysis the insurgent forces are under Hanoi influence. So, curiously, we think it's in Sihanouk's interest to govern with some element of -- not Lon Nol -- but some other forces in Phnom Penh that he can use as a balance to help him preserve his position.

To be concrete, we would be prepared to cooperate in a peace conference whose practical result would be the return of Sihanouk, the transformation of the existing structure in Phnom Penh, and the participation of the resistance forces. And then Sihanouk could have a more balanced structure to govern.

Vice Premier Teng: I'm afraid that your information is not accurate. For example, there is talk that the Cambodian war is being fought by the Vietnamese. The accurate information which I can give you is that there is not a single Vietnamese soldier fighting in Cambodia.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

17

Secretary Kissinger: That I believe, but the supplies come from Vietnam.

Vice Premier Teng: That's why I say your information is not accurate. You have to watch out, because the information supplied to you by Lon Nol is not accurate. And then you mentioned that the United States can't abandon those it has worked with. But, come to think of it, your relation with Lon Nol is only for four years.

Secretary Kissinger: I've told you we would be prepared to see a change in the structure in Phnom Penh as part of the solution. [Teng again spits into his spittoon.]

Vice Premier Teng: On this issue, Samdech Norodem Sihanouk has made many statements, and we support his statements.

Secretary Kissinger: With great passion.

Vice Premier Teng: That's true, and you don't lack passion either.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no emotional investment. And we don't oppose Sihanouk. He'll drive many people crazy before his political life is finished. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: How is that possible? Who will be driven mad?

Secretary Kissinger: He's rather changeable, if you look at his history. But he's the biggest national figure in Cambodia, and as I said, we're not opposed to him.

Vice Premier Teng: Regardless of his changes, he's a nationalist.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree, and we consider him the leader of the nationalist forces. Perhaps after the U.N. vote there could be a further exchange of views.

Vice Premier Teng: Well, so much about Cambodia then.

Nov 1974

TOASTS GIVEN AT SOOCHOW

Friday, Nov. 29, 1974

Mr. and Mrs. Kissinger, Ladies and Gentlemen, <sup>Friends</sup> and ~~Colleagues~~ <sup>Comrades</sup>.

Today <sup>His Excellency</sup> ~~the~~ Secretary of State <sup>Dr.</sup> and Mrs. Kissinger <sup>and other American friends</sup> have come to visit our city of Soochow. <sup>←</sup> With many happy feelings, I would <sup>like to present</sup> on behalf of our municipality and government of Soochow.

<sup>And Now I am glad</sup> would <sup>like</sup> to propose a toast to the health of Mr. Secretary of State <sup>Kissinger</sup> and <sup>and our other American friends</sup> Mrs. Kissinger <sup>Madame</sup> and to your pleasant stay here.

<sup>Vice</sup> Mr. Chairman of the <sup>Provincial Revolutionary Committee</sup> ~~General Federation~~, Mr. Vice Chairman of <sup>the Revolutionary Committee</sup> Soochow, Mr. Foreign Minister, and Friends:

On behalf of all my American colleagues and <sup>on behalf of</sup> my family, I would like to thank you for <sup>the</sup> a very <sup>warm</sup> welcome reception <sup>you have</sup> ~~here today~~ <sup>given us.</sup>

You have indeed mastered the Chinese art which we have all admired--<sup>for carefully</sup> making the ~~carefully~~ planned look spontaneous. One of my Chinese friends told me a Chinese proverb in the car which I would like my American colleagues to hear. <sup>And it is</sup> That it is better to quarrel with somebody from Soochow than to speak normally with someone from somewhere else. <sup>[laughter]</sup> So I would like to propose a toast to the people of Soochow, to the <sup>two</sup> Vice Chairmen and to the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples. ~~Gombay~~ <sup>Gambay</sup>.

Dec 24, 1974  
read to Han Hsu  
by PCH

Secretary Kissinger has asked me to meet with you today to inform you of certain matters of mutual interest.

In accordance with his desire to keep your government informed about important actions which we may be taking, he asked me to tell you about contacts we have been having with the French on the subject of Cambodia.

We have been informed by the French that Prince Sihanouk has discussed with them the question of achieving a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. It is our understanding <sup>from the French</sup> that your government is aware of this.

We are authorizing the French to give Sihanouk our response. We are working on the details ~~of that response~~ <sup>responsive</sup> which will be ~~responsive~~ with respect to the issues which we understand are of concern to Sihanouk.

If all goes as planned, we expect a French representative to present our views to Prince Sihanouk sometime soon after the new year. We will be in touch with the Chinese again on this matter to inform them more fully of our views. At this point we only wished them to know what we are doing.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

SECRET/SENSITIVE

January 16, 1975

To: The Secretary

From: EA-Philip C. Habib / S/P - Winston Lord

MEETING WITH HAN HSU - CAMBODIA; INDIA

We met with Han Hsu the evening of January 16. We informed him of our views on the Cambodian matter along the lines of the French message which will be given to the Chinese in the next day or so. Han Hsu seemed to be expecting something from us on this. He read what obviously was a prepared statement of one sentence to the effect that we know their consistent position is that they will not interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia and they support the just struggle of the Cambodian people. We replied that we understand that this has been their position but what we were doing was merely informing them of our views on this matter in accordance with our usual practice of making them aware of any important actions on our part. Han Hsu said he would convey our views to his Government.

We also told the Chinese that Ambassador Moynihan, in his discussion with their Foreign Minister, might have left the impression that we were actively promoting Sino-Indian relations. This was not correct. Our policy remains as you have explained to Chinese leaders, namely that we have no objection to the improvement of Sino-Indian relations but we believe this is a matter between their two countries. Han Hsu said they had not heard of this conversation yet but would report our comments to Peking.

Drafted by: EA:PCHabib/ S/P:WLord  
1/16/75 Ext. 29596

SECRET/SENSITIVE